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I. Introduction  
Close to three billion people—half of the world’s population—live 
on less than two dollars a day.1 Within these poor communities, one child 
in five will not live to see his or her fifth birthday.2 To boost international 
development, the United Nations (UN) announced the Millennium De-
velopment Goals, aimed at eradicating poverty by 2015.3 A number of 
countries responded at the International Conference for Financing Inter-
national Development in Monterrey, Mexico, by creating action plans to 
begin to implement the Millennium Development Goals.4 Yet the Millen-
nium Development Goals will prove difficult to achieve. 
International institutions, developed nations, and the developing 
world are approaching these development goals from many different per-
spectives. Much of the development community’s energy and efforts 
seem to be focused on cultivating long-term donors and securing foreign 
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 1. Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, How Have the World’s Poorest Fared 
Since the 1980s?, at 17 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3341, 2004), 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/36297_wps3341.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. G.A. Res. 2, UNGAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000). 
 4. See Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.198/11, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.A.7 (2002). 
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aid.5 The United States is focusing development assistance to countries 
that it views as having sound policies, through its Millennium Challenge 
Accounts.6 Additionally, many organizations are increasingly focused on 
international trade as a means to increase development.7 Indeed, the 
Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations explicitly 
addressed the role of trade in development,8 and high-level working 
groups are focusing on the importance of real development for trade.9  
Others focus on the critical importance of international capital 
flows,10 which swamp official governmental assistance.11 Currently, much 
attention is given to the development of efficient capital markets, empha-
sizing corporate governance, disclosure, and shareholder rights.12 In the 
banking sector, negotiations over the financial services agreement in the 
WTO have opened the banking sectors of many developing countries to 
foreign involvement, which in some instances is helping to deepen bank-
ing markets and strengthen banking institutions.13 The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision14 has focused on developing supervisory capac-
ity and the best practices in bank regulation to match this financial 
deepening, building on the Basel Committee’s success in promulgating 
the original Basel Capital Standards and its ongoing work on a new capi-
                                                                                                                      
 5. See generally The Development Gateway, available at http://topics. 
developmentgateway.org/alltopics/ for a list of topics commonly focused on by these devel-
opment initiatives.  
 6. See Sarah Lucas & Steven Radelet, An MCA Scorecard: Who Qualified, Who Did 
Not, and the MCC Board’s Use of Discretion (2004), available at http://www.cgdev.org/. 
 7. See, for example, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development website for 
resources devoted to furthering development through trade at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068. 
 8. See WTO, Announcement of the Doha Round, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
(2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
 9. See Robert Rubin et al., Sharing the Benefits of Trade, Fin. Times, May 19, 2003, at 
17. 
 10. See, e.g., IMF Research Dep’t Staff, Capital Flow Sustainability and Speculative 
Currency Attacks, Fin. & Dev. 34(4) (1997).  
 11. See IMF, World Economic Indicators (2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/1_3.pdf [hereinafter World Economic 
Indicators]; UNDP, Flows of Aid, Private Capital, and Debt, Human Development Report 
201, table 18 (2004), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf 
[hereinafter Aid, Private Capital, and Debt]. 
 12. See, e.g., Laura Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Com-
parative Evidence, Am. L. & Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2005). 
 13. See IMF Independent Evaluation Office, The IMF and Recent Capital Account 
Crises: Indonesia, Korea and Brazil (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/ieo/2003/cac/pdf/all.pdf. But see Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial 
Markets, in Annual World Bank Conference on Dev. & Econ. 19 (1994) (arguing that 
liberalization can often lead to financial crisis). 
 14. For information on the Basel Committee, see the official website at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/. 
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tal accord.15 At the same time, many developing countries have focused 
on lifting internal restrictions on credit, such as directed lending and in-
terest rate caps, which had blocked the growth of retail and consumer 
finance.16  
Domestic financial reforms have the potential to play a role in pov-
erty alleviation by deepening financial markets and institutions that may 
contribute to economic growth, which can, in turn, sometimes help pov-
erty alleviation.17 But the link between financial reform and poverty 
alleviation is not a straightforward one. Jalilian and Kirkpatrick argue 
that “[t]he refocusing of the goals of development strategy from an ex-
clusive concern with economic growth to growth with poverty reduction 
has increased interest in the contribution that financial development can 
make to poverty reduction in developing countries.”18 What that contribu-
tion might be is a matter for some debate. 
In that regard, microfinance is a form of financial development that 
has as its primary aim poverty alleviation. Microcredit, lending small 
sums to poor or near-poor households, achieved prominence in the 
1980s, thanks to innovative programs such as the Grameen Bank, 
launched by Mohammed Yunus,19 and enthusiastic support from govern-
ment officials, including President Clinton.20 The UN has designated 
2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. The UN has stated that 
                                                                                                                      
 15. To some extent, the experience of countries adopting the Basel Accords goes 
against the “institutionalist” and new institutional economics lessons about the difficulty of 
importing foreign standards. The Accords have been widely adopted and, although regulatory 
capacity differs markedly across countries, the Accords seem to have succeeded in preventing 
a regulatory race to the bottom of capital standards. Moreover, the fact that the standards are 
external gives backing to forces within developing countries seeking greater transparency and 
more effective supervision. Regional groups of bank regulators in the developing world have 
also formed alliances around the Accords to improve their supervisory capacity. See, e.g., 
Charles Goodhart et al., Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now? 
(1998). 
 16. CGAP, Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story So Far (Occa-
sional Paper no. 9, 2004), available at www.cgap.org/docs/OccasionalPaper_9.pdf; Jacob 
Yaron & McDonald Benjamin, Developing Rural Financial Markets, 34 (4) Fin. & Dev. 40 
(1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/12/pdf/yaron.pdf. 
 17. For variations on this theory, see Thorsten Beck et al., Finance and the Sources of 
Growth, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 261 (2000); Solomon Tadesse, Financial Architecture and Economic 
Performance: International Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Intermediation 429 (2002); Thierry Tressel, 
Dual Financial Systems and Inequalities in Economic Development, 8 J. Econ. Growth 223 
(2003); Hossein Jalilian & Colin Kirkpatrick, Financial Development and Poverty 
Reduction in Developing Countries (Fin. and Dev. Research Programme Working Paper 
No. 30, 2001).  
 18. Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, supra note 17, at 5. 
 19. See http://www.grameen-info.org for more information about the Grameen Bank. 
 20. See, e.g., President Bill Clinton, Address at the University of California, Berkeley 
(Jan. 29, 2002), transcript available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/features/2002/clinton/ 
clinton-transcript.html. For a good discussion of the rise of microcredit, see Jonathan Mor-
duch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. Econ. Lit. 1569 (1999). 
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microcredit programs have tripled within the past five years, and that 
nearly twenty-seven million people, mostly women, had become bor-
rowers by 2001.21 More than $1 billion in microcredit loans are 
outstanding today, and repayment rates are in excess of ninety-five per-
cent.22 Microfinance encompasses not only these microcredit programs, 
but also the full range of financial products that permit poor households 
to protect against economic risks—through access to credit, savings, in-
surance, and transactional services.23  
Although financial development can assist with poverty alleviation, 
and microfinance is a form of financial development that has as its aim 
poverty alleviation, most policymakers and scholars conduct separate 
conversations about financial development and microfinance. This Arti-
cle attempts to bridge that gap. The Article argues that microfinance can 
play an important role in financial development, and that by focusing on 
microfinance, development policy can strengthen the links between fi-
nancial development, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. Rather 
than focusing exclusively on microfinance as an anti-poverty strategy, 
microfinance should be seen as an integral component of a developing 
country’s broader financial development strategy. By demarginalizing 
microfinance programs serving the poor, our international financial insti-
tutions, donor nations, and developing countries may be able to more 
quickly reach the Millennium Development Goals.  
Parts II and III lay the basic groundwork for the argument. Part II 
briefly analyzes existing theoretical and empirical literature on the con-
nection between financial development, economic growth, and poverty 
alleviation. Part III explains microfinance. Part IV argues that microfi-
nance should be seen as part of a broader financial development strategy, 
not simply as a marginal program to serve the poor. My argument here is 
largely theoretical, even aspirational. Part IV also sketches some legal 
and policy implications of this approach, although full development of 
these policies is beyond the scope of this brief Article. Part V concludes. 
                                                                                                                      
 21. United Nations, Press Release GA/EF/3039, Under-Secretary-General Lauds Effec-
tiveness of Microcredit as Second Committee Takes Up Implementation of Decade for 
Eradication of Poverty (Sept. 10, 2003). 
 22. For comprehensive microfinance information, see The Microfinance Information 
Exchange Market, Who Are the Clients of Microfinance?, at http://www.mixmarket.org/en/ 
who_are_microfinance_clients.asp. 
 23. See generally The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), About Microfi-
nance, at http://www.cgap.org/about/faq01.html. 
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II. Financial Development and Growth  
Economic theory suggests that financial development can contribute 
to economic growth, and growth can contribute to poverty alleviation, 
although there is wide disagreement about whether and under what cir-
cumstances this occurs. It has long been observed that financial 
development accompanies economic growth, but the proposition that 
financial development promotes economic growth has been debated in 
the theoretical literature and has been questioned on empirical grounds. 
Schumpeter argued that banks are key to economic development because 
they channel society’s savings to entrepreneurs who innovate.24 Financial 
intermediaries have economies of scale in information gathering, as-
sessment, and monitoring; in mobilizing savings for investment; and in 
spreading and managing risk. Financial development can thus in theory 
improve a society’s allocation of resources.25 External finance comple-
ments internal corporate funding and permits firms to grow in size; 
larger firms, in turn, contribute to financial development, as their assets 
become collateral for loans, and their stocks and bonds become instru-
ments for investment. 
While not uncontested, empirical evidence linking economic growth 
with the development of strong financial architecture is promising.26 An 
assessment of the last few decades of comparative research shows that 
“higher levels of financial development are significantly and robustly 
correlated with faster current and future rates of economic growth, 
physical capital accumulation and economic efficiency improvements 
. . . . [F]inance does not only follow growth: finance seems importantly 
to lead to economic growth.”27  
In addition to determining whether financial development promotes 
growth, research has attempted to determine how and under what cir-
cumstances financial development leads to growth. Some scholars focus 
on comparing the circumstances best suited for capital market-led 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See, J.A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development 74 (1955). See 
also R.W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (1969); R.I. McKinnon, 
Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973); J.G. Gurley & E.S. Shaw, Finan-
cial Aspects of Economic Development, 45 Am. Econ. Rev. 515 (1955). 
 25. See generally Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Sys-
tems (2000). 
 26. See Felix Eschenbach, Finance and Growth: A Survey of the Theoretical 
and Empirical Literature (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-039/2, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=530123. See also Ross Le-
vine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence 79 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 10766, 2004) (“financial development exerts a first-order impact 
on economic growth”), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766. 
 27. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpter Might Be Right, 
108 Q. J. Econ. 717, 717-18, 730 (1993). See also Tressel, supra note 17. 
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growth, versus those situations more appropriately led by the banking 
sector.28 The determining circumstances seem to be based on the strength 
of the country’s legal and financial institutions, with bank specialization 
in monitoring being more important in countries with weak contractual 
enforcement, and stronger legal institutions required for market-led 
economies that rely on the efficient transmission of information to reach 
large scale.29 Others argue that both sectors are necessary for growth and 
are mutually reinforcing, providing different functions to the economy, 
and to each other.30 
Moving from the link between financial development and economic 
growth to the link between financial development and poverty alleviation 
is more challenging. Higher levels of growth through financial develop-
ment can sometimes lead to poverty alleviation.31 Credit constraints from 
low-functioning financial systems and weak legal systems affect the poor 
more deeply than the wealthy, who can rely on relationships and ample 
assets in the face of information-poor and legally weak markets.32 Finan-
cial development could contribute to poverty alleviation directly, by 
easing credit constraints on the poor, and indirectly, by fostering eco-
                                                                                                                      
 28. See Tadesse, supra note 17. 
 29. Id. at 429–33. See also Arnoud W. Boot & Anjan Thakor, Financial System Archi-
tecture, 10 Rev. Fin. Stud. 693 (1997) (arguing that bank-based systems dominate the 
financial system at early stages of development, while market-based systems dominate when 
information is more widespread). 
 30. See Levine, supra note 27, at 79; Goodhart et al., supra note 15 (arguing that 
thick capital markets reinforce banking institutions because such markets contribute to exter-
nally raised bank capital, lessen the likelihood of regulatory capture, and provide a market for 
defaulted collateral that improves incentives for collection); Ross Levine, Bank-Based or 
Market-Based Financial Systems: Which is Better? (William Davidson Working Paper 
Series No. 442, 2002) (arguing that empirical evidence does not support either a bank-based or 
market-based view of development but that strong legal institutions support financial devel-
opment). 
 31. See generally Thorsten Beck et al., Finance, Inequality and Poverty: 
Cross-Country Evidence (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
10979, 2004), available at http://legacy.csom.umn.edu/WWWPages/FACULTY/RLevine/ 
POVERTY.pdf.  
 32. See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and 
Development, 64 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 151 (1997); Abhijit Banerjee & Andrew Newman, 
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 274 (1993); Oded 
Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 35 
(1993). See also Stephen Haber et al., The Politics of Property Rights: Political 
Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 
(2003); Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: 
Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Oppor-
tunity (2003); Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and 
Growth, J. Econ. Lit. (forthcoming 2005). 
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nomic growth that benefits the poor. Cross-country comparisons suggest 
that financial development does reduce income inequality.33 
There are lots of cases, however, where financial development does 
not lead to poverty alleviation.34 Inequality within domestic economies 
can be eased through expanding access to the financial system,35 but so 
too can inequalities be perpetuated or worsened through unequal access 
to a growing financial sector.36 Economic growth can leave many low-
income households behind. 
Furthermore, financial development without an appropriate focus on 
governance—including regulation and supervision of the financial sec-
tor, as well as broader measures of transparent, honest governance—can 
contribute to financial crises that harm the poor the most.37 For example, 
the financial crises in both Thailand and Indonesia caused economic dis-
locations that wreaked havoc on poor households in those countries.38 
Furthermore, weak legal institutions that do not protect and enforce 
creditor and investor rights inhibit financial development.39 Moreover, 
weak enforcement can make it difficult for financial institutions to col-
lect against collateral. When that occurs, relationship lending dominates 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Beck, supra note 17; George Clarke et al., Finance and Income Inequality: 
Test of Alternative Theories (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2984, 
2003). 
 34. See generally Jeremy Greenwood & Boyan Jovanovic, Financial Development, 
Growth, and the Distribution of Income, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1076 (1990) (arguing as a theoreti-
cal matter that financial development contributes to income inequality at early stages of 
development because the wealthy can reap better returns on their savings). See also Marto-
dinoto Mubyarto, Poverty in Indonesia Before and After the Crisis, in Poverty Reduction: 
What’s New and What’s Different (Asian Development Bank ed., 2001), available at 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/Poverty_Reduction/Chap4.pdf. 
 35. See generally Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 121 (2004); 
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101 (2005). See also Thorsten 
Beck & Michael Fuchs, Structural Issues in the Kenyan Financial System: Improv-
ing Competition and Access (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3363, 2004), 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/37048_wps3363.pdf. 
 36. See Stephen Haber, Industrial Concentration and the Capital Markets: A Compara-
tive Study of Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, 1830-1930, 51 J. Econ. Hist. 559 (1991); 
Stephen Haber, Mexico’s Experiment with Bank Privatization and Liberalization, 1991-2003, 
J. Banking & Fin. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~haber/ 
papers.html. 
 37. See Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, supra note 17, at 4. 
 38. Microfinance institutions and their borrowers seem to have fared better than others. 
See Hassan Zaman, Microfinance in Bangladesh: Growth, Achievements, and Lessons, in 
Scaling Up Poverty Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance 47, CGAP Conference Report 
(May 2004) [hereinafter Scaling Up Poverty Reduction], available at http://www.cgap.org/ 
docs/CaseStudy_scalingup.pdf. 
 39. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); 
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Finance 1131 (1997); 
Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 
653 (2003).  
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and intermediaries do not look to a broader potential base of borrowers. 
Under such circumstances, banks lend to favored customers, but not to 
the broader public.40 Financial development can also stall out because of 
“financial repression,”41 which encompasses problems endemic to some 
developing countries, such as crony capitalism and pervasive interest rate 
controls that limit the supply of finance. 
Financial development can also occur more slowly because of low 
demand. For instance, there may be too few people who possess collat-
eral and assets that would enable them to borrow,42 potential borrowers 
may own assets that are not readily transferable to bank collateral, or 
households may lack credit histories and bank accounts to demonstrate 
creditworthiness.43 That is, poverty itself diminishes the possibilities for 
financial development. As Stiglitz posits, “[m]arket failure is a funda-
mental cause of poverty, and financial market failures, particularly 
asymmetric information and high, fixed costs of small scale lending limit 
the access of the poor to formal finance.”44  
If financial development can lead to poverty alleviation under some 
circumstances, then there ought to be greater attention paid to the ques-
tion of what those circumstances are. The contribution of this Article is 
simply to suggest that focusing on microfinance might be an important 
lens through which to begin to answer at least a part of that question. To 
explain why, I first lay out some basics of microfinance, and then I ex-
plain what I mean by focusing on microfinance. I then analyze how 
microfinance can contribute broadly to financial development. 
III. Microfinance 
Microfinance is a form of financial development that is primarily fo-
cused on alleviating poverty through providing financial services to the 
poor. Most people think of microfinance, if at all, as being about micro-
credit, lending small amounts of money to the poor. Microfinance is that, 
but it is also broader, including insurance, transactional services, and 
importantly, savings. There is now a reasonably large body of literature 
explaining why and under what conditions microfinance works.45 Recent 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See, e.g., Goodhart et al., supra note 15. 
 41. See Ronald MacKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development 
(1973). 
 42. See Hernando DeSoto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs 
in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000). 
 43. Barr, supra note 35, at 158.  
 44. Stiglitz, supra note 13, at 19-52.  
 45. See CGAP’s extensive microcredit library at http://www.cgap.org and The Microfi-
nance Gateway’s resources at http://www.microfinancegateway.org.  
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debates focus on whether microfinance can be self-sustaining by charg-
ing higher interest rates and becoming more efficient,46 or whether it can 
and should reach deeper into the ranks of the poor.47  
The financial services commonly available to the poor in developing 
countries “often have serious limitations in terms of cost, risk, and con-
venience.”48 Microfinance institutions play a complementary role to the 
banking system by extending credit to borrowers whom banks view as 
too costly or too risky to reach. Lacking collateral, and often living far 
from banks, poor households often turn to expensive informal money-
lenders when confronted with urgent credit needs. Repayment of these 
moneylenders may leave some families worse off.49 Microfinance institu-
tions attempt to compete with moneylenders by offering credit to a 
broader range of households on more favorable terms.  
Microcredit institutions use a variety of strategies, which have been 
reported on in detail elsewhere, to reduce their own risks: superior in-
formation about borrowers to reduce risks given low or nonexistent 
collateral; peer lending circles to serve as pre-screening devices to re-
duce information asymmetry; joint liability contracts among borrowers 
to enforce payment despite weak legal institutions; short-term loan con-
tracts with regular repayments to substitute for information; loan ladders 
that permit successful borrowers to take out increasingly larger loans as 
incentives for repayment; social networks and shaming to increase re-
payment rates; and a variety of other substitutes for information, 
collateral, and legal enforcement to extend credit to low-income borrow-
ers without collateral assets.50  
                                                                                                                      
 46. See, e.g., Morduch, supra note 20. 
 47. See, e.g., MicroCredit Summit, at http://www.microcreditsummit.org/. 
 48. CGAP, About Microfinance, at http://www.cgap.org/about/microfinance.html. 
 49. Id.  
 50. See Michael Fiebig et al., Savings in the Context of Microfinance—State of Knowl-
edge, CGAP Working Group on Savings Mobilization Document (1999), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/assets/images/savings.pdf; Rafael Gomez & Eric Santor, Membership 
Has Its Privileges: The Effect of Social Capital and Neighborhood Character on Earnings of 
Microfinance Borrowers, 34 Canadian J. Econ. 943 (2001); Sanjay Jain & Ghazal Mansuri, 
A Little at a Time: The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments in Microfinance Programs, 72 
J. Dev. Econ. 253 (2003); Ana Marr, Studying Group Dynamics: An Alternative Analytical 
Framework for the Study of Microfinance Impacts on Poverty Reduction, 14 J. Int’l Dev. 511 
(2002); Linda Mayoux, Tackling the Downside: Social Capital, Women’s Empowerment and 
Microfinance in Cameroon, 32 Dev. & Change 435 (2001); Angelyn Zephyr, Money is Not 
Enough: Social Capital and Microcredit, 13 Issues in Pol. Econ. (2004); Alain de Janvry et 
al., Up the Lending Ladder: Extending Financial Services for the Rural Poor Through Credit-
Reporting Bureaus (2003), available at http://www.basis.wisc.edu/live/basbrief16.pdf; Craig 
McIntosh & Bruce Wydick, Competition and Microfinance (2004), available at http://www-
irps.ucsd.edu/academics/McIntosh%20CompetitionMicrofinance.pdf. But see Malgosia Mada-
jewicz, Is the Popularity of Group Loan Deserved? The Impact of Microcredit on Poverty, in 
Credit Markets for the Poor (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., forthcoming 
9
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Microfinance institutions have developed a strong track record over 
the last thirty years in alleviating poverty and advancing the economic 
needs of low-income households.51 Microfinance programs have been 
found to increase and diversify household income, promote household 
savings, and permit “consumption smoothing” in the face of volatility of 
income.52 Studies have also found that microfinance clients have better 
educational and health outcomes.53 Others have found that microfinance 
can, under some circumstances, empower women in their households as 
well as in society more generally.54 There are, of course, problems with 
particular microfinance organizations such as default rates that, in some 
instances, are too high, and there is a general need for greater transpar-
ency regarding loan performance and other measures, which industry 
leaders are beginning to address.55 My focus is elsewhere, however; I 
want to look at how microfinance can contribute more broadly to finan-
cial development. 
                                                                                                                      
2005) (arguing that collateralized loans would benefit the better-off among credit-constrained 
borrowers as compared to peer-monitored loans). 
 51. See generally Morduch, supra note 20; Elizabeth Littlefield et al., Is Micro-
finance an Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium Development Goals? 
(CGAP Focus Note 23, 2003), at http://www.cgap.org/docs/FocusNote_24.html. 
 52. Littlefield et al., supra note 51, at para. 11 (citing Barbara MkNelly & 
Christopher Dunford, Impact of Credit with Education on Mothers and Their 
Young Children’s Nutrition: CRECER Credit with Education Program in Bolivia 
(Freedom from Hunger Research Paper No. 5, 1999)). See also M. Hossain, Credit for the 
Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (1988); Shahidur 
Khandker, Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh (1998); 
Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation: Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific (Joe 
Remenyi & Benjamin Quinones, Jr. eds., 2000); Anton Simanowitz, Appraising the Pov-
erty Outreach of Microfinance: A Review of the CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool 
(PAT) (Imp-Act Programme Occasional Paper No. 1, 2002); Hassan Zaman, Assessing the 
Poverty and Vulnerability Impact of Micro-Credit in Bangladesh: A Case Study of 
BRAC (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2145, 2000); Carolyn Barnes, 
Microfinance Program Clients and Impact: An Assessment of Zambuko Trust, Zim-
babwe, (USAID-AIMS Paper 2001); S. Mustafa et al., Beacon of Hope: An Impact 
Assessment of BRAC’s Rural Development Programme, BRAC Research and Evaluation 
Division Document (1996). 
 53. Littlefield et al., supra note 51, at para. 3 (citing A. Mushtaque et al., Do Pov-
erty Alleviation Programmes Reduce Inequities in Health? Lessons from Bangladesh, in 
Poverty, Inequality and Health, An International Perspective (David Leon & Gill 
Walt eds., 2000)). 
 54. Littlefield et al., supra note 51, at para. 19 (citing Susy Cheston & Lisa Kuhn 
Fraioli, Empowering Women through Microfinance, in Pathways Out of Poverty: Innova-
tions in Microfinance for the Poorest Families (Sam Daley-Harris ed., 2002)). 
 55. See generally Robert Peck Christen, In Search of Credibility: Transparency and the 
Microfinance Industry, The Microbanking Bulletin No. 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.mixmbb.org/en/mbb_issues/07/mbb7_article2.pdf. 
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IV. Microfinance and Financial Development 
To what extent can a focus on microfinance make it more likely that 
financial development leads to poverty alleviation? What do I mean by 
focusing on microfinance? I do not mean simply focusing on microfi-
nance institutions and learning about their techniques for risk mitigation, 
although these topics are quite interesting in their own right. I do not 
mean simply focusing on microfinance borrowers—that is, the unique 
nature and needs of the poor and near poor, their assets, and their human 
capital, although I also think this topic is quite important. What I do 
mean is thinking about financial development as a whole from the van-
tage point of facilitating a microfinance system.  
This is somewhat odd. In designing policies and institutions for the 
core financial institutions in society, how could it help for us to think 
about the marginal, the fringe, the poor? After all, microfinance currently 
is quite small in comparison to: (a) the problem of economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation;56 (b) private capital flows to the developing 
world;57 and (c) government and donor contributions.58 Moreover, the 
poor are often marginalized within their own societies and are rarely 
thought of as important for a country’s macroeconomic development. In 
addition, reforming weak legal institutions and advancing good govern-
ance are critical for development and ought to be undertaken directly 
when possible.  
Nevertheless, viewing financial development through the lens of mi-
crofinance might help for four reasons, which I explore in more detail in 
the sections that follow: First, financially self-sustainable microfinance 
programs can contribute directly, and at scale, to poverty alleviation, and 
promote market deepening that in turn advances financial development. 
Second, microfinance may be a useful strategy to consider in countries 
with bad governance where other development strategies face significant 
barriers. Third, microfinance can help financial markets in developing 
countries to mature, while playing more limited, but useful, roles in pov-
erty alleviation in both financially undeveloped and financially 
developed countries. Fourth, microfinance can help to break down oppo-
sition to, and build support for, domestic financial reforms.  
                                                                                                                      
 56. See supra note 1 (stating that more than three billion people live on less than $2 per 
day).  
 57. The IMF’s World Economic Indicators show that more than $120.4 billion in pri-
vate capital flowed to the developing world in 2003. See World Economic Indicators, supra 
note 11. 
 58. Developing countries received over $55 billion in official development assistance in 
2002. See Aid, Private Capital and Debt, supra note 11. 
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A. Sustainable Microfinance 
Microfinance institutions themselves might increasingly reach finan-
cial self-sustainability and attract private capital flows to their mission of 
poverty alleviation. Private financial flows are attractive for obvious rea-
sons. Private flows instead of government flows mean donor 
governments are spending less on development aid (or less for this pur-
pose), and microfinance institutions would not need to rely on fickle 
donors. Private capital flows dwarf development assistance, and steering 
some of these flows to the service of microfinance for the poor could 
make a real difference for millions of households. Moreover, relying on 
private flows of finance will put pressure on microfinance institutions to 
provide greater transparency and to become more efficient in their opera-
tions, which, in turn, would be beneficial to donors, the institutions, and 
borrowers. 
Microfinance institutions have demonstrated that it is possible to 
serve poor clients, operate in a financially sound manner, and reach 
scale. The Microfinance Exchange, which tracks performance for about 
150 microfinance institutions, has found that about forty percent of the 
institutions it tracks are financially self-sufficient, and many others are 
nearly so.59 Financial self-sustainability does not seem to be confined to 
a particular lending strategy, region, or poverty status of the borrower 
base. For example, the Association for Social Advancement, BRAC 
(formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), the 
Grameen Bank, and Proshika together provide credit to 11.5 million 
households in Bangladesh.60 A number of microfinance institutions in 
Latin America are growing rapidly, and operating successfully. For ex-
ample, CrediAmigo, a microfinance program operated by Banco do 
Nordeste in Brazil, has provided 300,000 poor households with access to 
microfinance in the last five years.61 In Kenya, the Equity Building Soci-
ety has grown to 250,000 depositors over the last decade.62 Bank Rakyat 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See Microbanking Bulletin, Focus on Standardization, No. 8 (Nov. 2002); Mi-
crobanking Bulletin, Focus on Savings, No. 9 (July 2003), both available at 
http://www.mixmbb.org/en/index.html. The microfinance institutions that the Microbanking 
Bulletin tracks, however, are not likely to be representative of the industry as a whole. These 
institutions are likely to be among the better performers. One cannot argue from this data that 
the industry as a whole is moving towards financial self-sustainability, but rather that a signifi-
cant part of the best institutions are doing so. 
 60. Zaman, supra note 38, at 49. 
 61. Robert Peck Christen, Struggling Through the “Growth versus Best Practice” 
Tradeoff: The CrediAmigo Program of the Banco de Nordeste, Brazil, in Scaling Up Pov-
erty Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance, supra note 38, at 1. 
 62. Tamara Cook, Equity Building Society: A Domestic Financial Institution Scales up 
Microfinance, in Scaling Up Poverty Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance, supra 
note 38, at 15. 
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Indonesia (BRI) serves over three million poor borrowers with $1.7 bil-
lion in loans and provides bank accounts to some thirty million low-
income households, who have saved an aggregate of $3.1 billion.63 
Moreover, microfinance programs are increasingly being linked to remit-
tances from abroad as a development strategy. Given the large size of 
these flows, which account for a significant part of gross domestic prod-
uct in some developing countries,64 remittances may become an 
important source of capital for microfinance institutions.  
While there has been enormous progress in this regard, reaching fi-
nancial self-sustainability and scale has proved elusive for many 
microfinance institutions, and even those that are now self-sustaining 
have required significant donor support.65 This is not surprising, because 
even with high repayment rates, the transaction costs in lending small 
amounts to lots of poor borrowers are high. Moreover, even if self-
sufficiency can be realized, private flows can have downsides too—they 
flow out, as well as in, as the Asian crisis and its aftermath demon-
strated. Indeed, data from Indonesia suggest that the microfinance 
institutions did well there while other financial firms failed in part be-
cause short-term loans with tight repayment schedules did not leave 
them highly exposed, in part because of borrower repayment discipline 
driven by the need to borrow in the future, and in part because their 
sources of funds were not as liquid, and external, as other firms.66 Still, 
the drive towards financial self-sustainability can help to improve the 
efficiency, discipline, and transparency of microfinance institutions,  
all to the good, even if the industry as a whole does not reach financial 
self-sufficiency and always requires donor funding. Financial self-
sustainability is the best case scenario. How does microfinance matter in 
the worst case scenario? 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Klaus Maurer, Bank Rakyat Indonesia: Twenty Years of Large-Scale Microfinance, 
in Scaling Up Poverty Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance, supra note 38, at 95. 
 64. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 35, at 195–98 (citing the Mexican example); Manuel 
Orozco, The Remittance Marketplace: Prices, Policy and Financial Institutions (Pew 
Hispanic Center Report 2004), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/28.pdf; Scott 
Robinson, Remittances, Microfinance and Community Informatics: Development and Govern-
ance Issues (2004), available at http://www.fdc.org.au/files/RobinsonpaperREMIT.pdf; Robert 
Suro et al., Billions in Motion: Latino Immigrants, Remittances and Banking (Pew 
Hispanic Center & Multicultural Investment Fund Report 2002) (stating that 14.6% of the El 
Salvadorian gross domestic product and 15% of the Haitian gross domestic product is derived 
from remittances), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/13.pdf. 
 65. There is also some ambiguity in defining financially self-sustaining programs. See, 
e.g., Morduch, supra note 20; Terry Buss, Microenterprise in International Perspective: An 
Overview of the Issues, 1 Int’l J. Econ. Dev. 1 (1999), available at http://www.spaef.com/ 
sample.pdf; Joan Parker & Doug Pearce, Linking Microfinance and Safety Net Pro-
grams to Include the Poorest (CGAP Focus Note 20, 2001), available at 
www.cgap.org/docs/FocusNote_20.html. 
 66. See, e.g., Maurer, supra note 63, at 97–98. 
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B. Microfinance as a Strategy in the Face of Poor Governance 
Microfinance institutions might grow up in the cracks between the 
cement blocks of bad government. Microfinance institutions would help 
alleviate poverty and, over time, grow domestic credit demand slowly 
despite weak formal institutions, legal and otherwise. Microfinance insti-
tutions can thrive in weak legal and other formal institutional 
environments because they largely do not have to rely on such formal 
institutions to operate.67 Many of the risk-mitigation techniques devel-
oped by microfinance institutions, such as peer lending, are functional 
substitutes for legal-institution-intensive forms of creditor protection, 
such as enforcement on collateral. Microfinance is a form of financial 
development that, at least in its initial stages, can thrive without relying 
heavily on government regulation or support, or strong legal institutions 
that permit the poor to borrow against their assets or creditors to col-
lect.68 
In that regard, microfinance might be an important financial devel-
opment strategy in the face of weak, incompetent, or corrupt governance, 
and in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.69 Bad governance can hinder 
microfinance’s growth,70 and good governmental policies certainly can 
and should be used to advance microfinance. Macroeconomic instability 
can wreak havoc with microfinance programs, and corruption can harm 
institutions seeking government licenses to operate.71 Some licensing 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See, e.g., Robert C. Vogel, Other People’s Money: Regulatory Issues Facing Micro-
finance Programs, in Strategic Issues in Microfinance 210 (Mwangi S. Kemenyi et al., 
eds., 1998). 
 68. See DeSoto, supra note 42 (arguing that high transaction costs and the absence of 
legal rules permitting legal recognition of the assets of the poor as collateral inhibit the expan-
sion of access to credit). 
 69. See Christen, supra note 61. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts using microfinance 
are likely to be quite difficult and failure rates might be higher than in other circumstances; 
nonetheless, it is worth exploring the role that microfinance can play in such scenarios. Tam-
sin Wilson, Microfinance During and After Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, 
Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda (Concern Worldwide & Springfield Centre for Busi-
ness in Development Document, 2002), available at http://www.postconflictmicrofinance.org/ 
PCM%20Synthesis%20Report.pdf; Microfinance Best Practices Project, Microfinance 
Following Conflict: Introduction to Technical Briefs (MBP Microfinance Following 
Conflict Brief No. 1, 2001)(on file with Mich. J. Int’l L.); Karen Doyle, Microfinance in 
the Wake of Conflict: Challenges and Opportunities (Microenterprise Best Practices 
Working Paper, 1998). But see Microcredit: One of Many Intervention Strategies 
(CGAP Donor Brief No. 2, 2002), available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/DonorBrief_02.pdf 
(arguing that post-conflice reconstruction is too risky to deploy microfinance successfully). 
 70. See, e.g., Zaman, supra note 38 (explaining the importance of sound macroeco-
nomic policies to the growth of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh); Maurer, supra note 63 
(explaining the importance of interest rate deregulation and macroeconomic stability to the 
growth of BRI in Indonesia). 
 71. See Scaling Up Poverty Reduction, supra note 38 (discussing importance of macro-
economic stability); Jeffery R. Franks, Microeconomic Stabilization and the 
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restrictions that prevent nonprofit nongovernmental organizations from 
providing credit can undoubtedly block the growth of microfinance, and 
interest rate and other controls can make microfinance unprofitable, and 
unsustainable, for both specialized institutions as well as mainstream 
banks. I am distinctly not arguing in favor of the proposition that gov-
ernmental policies should be ignored.  
If we have learned anything in the last generation about the role of 
law in development, however, it is that strengthening society’s institu-
tions is not simply a matter of writing better laws.72 The reform of legal 
institutions is a long-term strategy. Thus, the possibility for microfinance 
to exist even in bad policy and governance environments might suggest a 
strategy for donors dealing with such countries,73 instead of either pump-
ing aid dollars through ineffective, corrupt, or repressive regimes, or 
refusing to help the poor in those countries. 
Microfinance institutions can play an important role in development 
in circumstances where other sectors of the economy are repressed. Mi-
crofinance institutions can help to improve the ability of the poor to 
build assets, increase price competition and drive down interest rates, 
and lay the groundwork for banking sector development should legal 
institutions take root. In developing countries with weak governance, the 
emphasis on financial development may be more successful by focusing, 
at least initially, on a strategy of financial growth that relies on microfi-
nance institutions.  
This is admittedly a risky strategy, particularly for microfinance ad-
vocates. Microfinance institutions operating in bad legal and policy 
environments are likely to fare much worse than their counterparts else-
where, and high failure rates may not only harm local development but 
also drag down the reputation of microfinance generally and thus harm 
efforts in other countries that are lower risk. Still, the risk may be worth 
exploring in countries where other options are limited. 
                                                                                                                      
Microentrepreneur, 2 J. Microfinance 69 (2000); Robert Peck Christen, In Search of Credi-
bility: Transparency and the Microfinance Industry, Microbanking Bulletin No. 5 (2001), 
available at http://www.mixmbb.org/en/mbb_issues/07/mbb7_article2.pdf; Nimal Fernando, 
Do Governments in Asia Have a Role in Development of Sustainable Microfinance Services? 
(2004), at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Slideshows/Microfinance/Fernando_paper.pdf. 
 72. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transitional 
Economies (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working Paper No. 48, 
2000). 
 73. See, e.g., Tomás Miller Sanabria, Microfinance: Lessons Learned in Latin 
America (Inter-American Development Bank Document 2000), available at http://www. 
iadb.org/mif/v2/files/microeng.pdf. 
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C. Microfinance to Help Develop the Banking Sector 
Microfinance institutions can also be an important part of a strategy 
to strengthen the banking system and promote financial development 
more broadly. Tressel’s study of formal and informal methods of credit 
in developing countries suggests that formal institutions such as banks 
“develop successfully only if a sufficiently large demand for bank loans 
materializes.”74 While most studies focus primarily on supply,75 Tressel 
shows why demand matters too.76 Particularly in countries with weak 
legal infrastructure and concentrated asset-holding, financial institutions 
are unable to reach broadly to lend throughout the society. Banks focus 
on relationship lending with political and economic elites. By contrast, 
as asset-holding broadens information is more widely dispersed, strong 
legal institutions develop, and banks are able to lend more broadly. 
Banks can mobilize savings at a scale not possible for small, informal 
institutions. Thus, banks can “reduce the fragmentation of capital mar-
kets in developing countries.”77  
Microfinance institutions may play an important role in “priming the 
pump” for bank development. Rotating savings and credit associations, 
curb markets, and moneylenders are often considered transitive, but 
“their informational advantages are now widely acknowledged.”78 Be-
cause of their proximity to their borrowers, these organizations have the 
ability to gain intimate first-hand knowledge of their clients, and can 
impose social sanctions to increase enforcement rates.79 Because infor-
mal lenders are in practice often restricted by geography, population, or 
time, however, they are generally unable to raise large amounts of capi-
tal, thereby limiting the amount of financial growth that can occur.80  
Microfinance institutions can position themselves as intermediaries 
between the formal and informal sectors. They may be better able to 
monitor local markets. Microfinance institutions “complement the bank-
ing system in the first stages of development when collateral is scarce,” 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Tressel, supra note 17, at 225. 
 75. See, e.g., Valerie Bencivenga & Bruce Smith, Financial Intermediation and En-
dogenous Growth, 58 Rev. Econ. Stud. 195 (1991); Jeremy Greenwood & Boyan Jovanovic, 
Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1076 
(1990); Robert King & Ross Levine, Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and 
Evidence, 32 J. Monetary Econ. 513 (1993); Marco Pagano, Financial Markets and Growth: 
An Overview, 37 Eur. Econ. Rev. 613 (1993). 
 76. Tressel, supra note 17, at 225.  
 77. Id. at 231. 
 78. Id. at 225. 
 79. Timonthy Besley, Savings, Credit and Insurance, in Handbook of Development 
Economics (Jere Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995).  
 80. See, e.g., Giang Ho, Rural Credit Markets in Vietnam: Theory and Practice (2004) 
(unpublished Honors Thesis, Macalester College), available at http://aede.ag.ohio-
state.edu/essay/. 
16
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 46 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art46
BARR ARTICLE FTP.DOC 4/5/2005 11:56 AM 
Fall 2004] Microfinance and Financial Development 287 
 
even though banks need to reach further into the market dominated by 
the informal sector in order to finish the development process.81 As Tres-
sel notes, “[l]ocal institutions have an important role to play in the early 
stages of industrialization because of their ability to exploit local-
informal-information; when the average size of firms increases, modern 
banks that collect savings on a large scale emerge and progressively 
dominate the financial sector.”82  
The potential for microfinance to contribute to financial develop-
ment is likely to vary based on the types of institutions and policies in 
place in individual countries, as well as their levels of development. To 
this end, a typology will be useful in assessing what role microfinance 
institutions can play in financial development in a given country. 
Generally, financially developed countries have strong legal and 
regulatory enforcement infrastructures. Their capital markets work effi-
ciently. Financial institutions serve broad sectors of society, even if 
segments of the population are unable to access the financial sector due 
to market failures, discrimination, or other societal problems. Microfi-
nance can best be used in these countries to help to correct these market 
failures by expanding access to credit for small firms unable to access 
bank credit because they are small, new, asset-poor, and opaque. Given 
the high costs of operating in regulated, advanced economies, coupled 
with the likelihood that the customer bases of microfinance institutions 
in the developed world are likely to need other, nonfinancial interven-
tions (such as job training, child care, or social services, which many 
microfinance institutions feel compelled to provide), it will be quite dif-
ficult for most microfinance institutions to operate on a financially self-
sustainable basis. Donor or governmental funding is likely to remain 
quite important. The regulation of financial institutions can and should 
be tailored to make it possible for both mainstream and specialized insti-
tutions to engage in microlending. For example, regulators should pay 
greater attention to nontraditional forms of collateral and documentation 
in evaluating the safety and soundness of bank lending. A range of in-
centives could also be deployed to encourage mainstream banks to 
engage in providing microfinancial services.83  
In financially undeveloped countries, microcredit can serve to reduce 
prevailing high interest rates in the informal sector through bringing in-
creased levels of competition. The financial sector is likely to be 
fragmented, however, and microcredit is unlikely to serve a broader eco-
nomic function unless microfinance institutions are able to attract 
                                                                                                                      
 81. Tressel, supra note 17, at 226. 
 82. Id. at 227. 
 83. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 35, passim. 
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significant levels of outside financial support. Until the banking sector 
begins to develop, microcredit in this context is primarily a means of 
smoothing consumption, spreading risk, improving incomes, and creat-
ing the possibility for saving at a lower cost of credit than in the informal 
sector. These efforts are important components of poverty alleviation in 
their own right. Because many financially undeveloped countries lack 
meaningful regulatory and supervisory infrastructures, microfinancial 
“regulation”—in the form of donor oversight—would initially be the 
province of foreign governments, multilateral development banks, and 
nongovernmental organizations.84 
Financially developing countries, the middle type, present the most 
interesting case for the role of microfinance in financial development, 
and are the focus of the remainder of this section. These developing 
countries vary greatly, but are characterized as having somewhat func-
tional banking systems. These countries may possess rudimentary 
securities markets, although the quality and reliability of these ex-
changes is likely to vary greatly. Furthermore, developing countries are 
likely to have some capacity for supervising and enforcing some types of 
regulation. Banks in these countries offer investors liquidity in thin mar-
kets and extend loans largely to their established customers who 
maintain balances at the banks. New or small customers have difficulty 
getting bank credit.85 Information about the risks of extending credit be-
yond these groups is not as available as it is in developed economies.86 
Microfinance institutions in these financially developing nations can 
play important roles in the banking sector. First, by helping to increase 
the income and asset base of the poor, they may increase demand for 
bank loans.87 Once poor individuals’ income bases increase, they will be 
more frequently able to qualify for loans. Strong microfinancial sectors 
in these countries could help banks to “finish” the financial market—to 
get the market to a point where it is adequately serving all segments of 
society. Microfinance institutions could help banks to reach previously 
marginalized sectors; however, nondepository microcredit institutions on 
their own are unlikely to be able to overcome market fragmentation, 
given their inability to mobilize savings at scale, or attract large enough 
amounts of capital.  
Second, microfinance institutions can help develop and prove finan-
cial techniques for reaching the poor at lower cost and lower risk. While 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See, e.g., CGAP, at http://www.cgap.org; Transparency International, available at 
http://www.transparency.org. 
 85. Goodhart et al., supra note 15. 
 86. See Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy (Margaret J. 
Miller ed., 2003). 
 87. See Tressel, supra note 17, at 244. 
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some techniques are quite labor intensive and not easily transferable to 
the banking sector as a whole, other techniques can be used by the finan-
cial sector to reach more broadly into the market, which will help 
accelerate the pace of development in the banking sector. For example, 
the development of credit histories for microfinance customers can be 
employed by banks to reduce the risk of lending to these households. 
Many microcredit institutions are themselves banks or other regulated 
financial institutions, and they have managed to employ a wide range of 
risk-mitigation techniques to serve the poor even within their regulatory 
structures. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BRI in Indonesia are the 
classic examples of microfinance-focused banks, but there are countless 
others. Over time, microfinance institutions employing these techniques 
can grow in scale. Moreover, at the same time, mainstream banks can 
move “down market” to serve lower-income households with microfi-
nance products, as has increasingly occurred in a number of Latin 
American countries. That is, innovative risk-mitigation techniques to 
serve the poor are not incompatible with regulated financial institutions, 
as evidenced by the commercialization of microfinance from above and 
below. 
Third, mainstream banks may partner with microfinance institutions. 
For example, banks could use smaller nondepository microfinance insti-
tutions to help mobilize savings that can then be intermediated by 
regulated financial institutions. That is, microfinance institutions can 
collect the savings, but in the interest of protecting depositors, regulated 
banks would hold them in exchange for a fee or wholesale deposit in the 
microfinance institution, and invest the retail savings in the diversified 
range of assets available to larger institutions.88 Banks could also partner 
with microfinance institutions in offering a broader range of financial 
products to the microfinance institutions’ clientele, with fee-sharing and 
risk-sharing arrangements designed to take advantage of each type of 
institution’s comparative expertise and institutional strength. 
Additionally, given high levels of concentration and volatility, mi-
crofinance institutions may wish to consider mechanisms to pool and 
diversify their risks. Different mechanisms could be developed based on 
the extent of information available in the market,89 as well as an assess-
ment of comparative institutional strength. As one example, donors 
might establish risk funds into which they match payments from finan-
cial institutions. Initial losses would come out of the microfinance 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See, e.g., Madeline Hirschland, Serving Small Depositors: Overcoming the Obsta-
cles, Recognizing the Tradeoffs, The Microbanking Bulletin No. 9, supra note 59 (noting 
pilot project for savings mobilization in Bolivia). 
 89. Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, Information Accumulation in Development, 
107 J. Pol. Econ. 539 (1999). 
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institution’s portion of the risk pool, but donor funds would serve as a 
backstop. These bolstered reserves would stand against microfinance 
losses, while the structure of the shared match would preserve appropri-
ate incentives. Microfinance borrowers could be required to pay a 
portion of the microfinance institution’s contribution to the loan loss re-
serve.
90
 The presence of the loan loss reserves may reduce capital market 
concerns about microfinance volatility and thus draw more funding into 
microfinance, while overall low loss rates experienced thus far should 
keep actual loan-loss fund distributions to a relatively low level. 
Existing mainstream banking organizations can also reach into mi-
crofinance. Donors and governments may assist banks in furthering their 
reach through carefully designed, targeted subsidies to banks, as has 
been successfully implemented in Chile. As Tressel argues, “subsidized 
bank loans for the poor may have an indirect impact on the cost of capi-
tal in the informal sector by increasing price competition for the 
borrowers who are credit rationed on the margin. Such a policy would 
unambiguously speed up the penetration of modern banks in poor ar-
eas.”
91
 Moreover, microfinance institutions “may have an indirect 
positive effect by reducing the market power of informal lenders even if 
their size is limited and they need to rely on subsidies.”92 Microfinance 
institutions can help to drive down interest rates, which benefits poor 
borrowers in the short term and helps them to accumulate assets.93 Lastly, 
the redistribution of wealth to the poor that bank-subsidized loans entail 
can improve credit market efficiency by increasing their assets, which 
could help to break down financial fragmentation and hasten the devel-
opment of a full-fledged banking sector that permits firms to raise capital 
on a scale needed for growth.94  
Thus, over time, microfinance institutions can contribute to a more 
robust financial system. Initially, microfinance institutions may serve a 
relatively small portion of the poor in a financially developing society. 
Given low levels of bank penetration, however, their potential customer 
base is potentially large in these societies. If the microfinance institu-
tions can attract sufficient capital and operate in a financially sound 
manner, they have the potential to become quite significant players in 
providing financial services and credit. As these institutions grow, some 
of them become better able to serve broader functions of financial inter-
                                                                                                                      
 90. This is done by capital access programs in the United States. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, Capital Access Programs: A Summary of Nationwide Performance (2001), 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/cap01.pdf.  
 91. Tressel, supra note 17, at 243.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id at 244.  
 94. Id.  
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mediation. Moreover, as the microfinance sector grows, mainstream fi-
nancial institutions may be better able, and more willing, to serve a 
broader segment of society. These institutions may begin to partner with 
each other, and the various financial sectors of economy may move to a 
more integrated financial system. 
D. Microfinance as a Strategy to Advance Domestic Reforms 
Focusing on the needs of a growing microfinance sector may lead 
domestic entities, including the private sector and the government, to 
respond by strengthening the domestic institutions needed for broad-
based financial development by both mainstream and microfinance insti-
tutions seeking to serve a broader segment of the population. 
Microfinance institutions may contribute to domestic demand for the 
better governmental and market institutions required for deeper financial 
development. Thus, microfinance institutions have strong potential to 
play a social role in these societies (indeed, this was often an impetus for 
their creation).95  
Microfinance can help foster internal demand for political changes 
regarding financial repression, including easing interest rate controls, 
permitting greater foreign ownership of financial firms, and ending di-
rected lending to cronies that hamper financial development for the 
financial sector as a whole. Entrenched elites who benefit from the cur-
rent system have little incentive to promote these changes even though 
financial development would benefit the country broadly.96 These elites 
have access to finance under the current system, and oppose any finan-
cial liberalization that increases competition.97 While opening up capital 
markets could play a strong role in diminishing the influence of these 
elites or changing the incentives facing them with respect to market re-
forms, capital market liberalization can also serve to entrench elites,98 or 
open up the economies of countries with weak governance structures to 
financial crises.99 While the effects of microfinance are necessarily more 
limited, growing microfinance institutions might be able to play a role in 
serving as a counterpoint to those who oppose reform. Microfinance in-
stitutions focus on serving poor and near-poor borrowers, and this focus 
seems largely, but not entirely, to be able to withstand commercialization 
                                                                                                                      
 95. See, e.g., Zaman, supra note 38 (noting role of Grameen Bank). This social role, 
however, can cut against moving toward financial self-sustainability and efficiency as a busi-
ness. 
 96. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of 
Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (2003). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 22. 
 99. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 13. 
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and larger scale.100 As microfinance becomes larger scale, more deeply 
capitalized, and more commercialized in some countries, these pressures 
can help to bolster the constituencies needed to demand improvements in 
the financial market overall.101 
Understanding the difficulties associated with supervising and regu-
lating microfinance institutions may lead central banks (or the 
appropriate bank regulatory body) to rethink their supervisory approach 
as a whole. For example, the growth and commercialization of microfi-
nance might put pressure on governments to remove interest rate 
controls and directed lending to cronies. Similarly, a focus on microfi-
nance might force regulators to move away from rigid capital adequacy 
and more toward risk-based supervision of internal systems for informa-
tion gathering, monitoring, and risk control. Unfortunately, many 
supervisors in the developing world will not have the capacity to do this 
well, even for mainstream banks, let alone microfinance institutions. 
Microfinance can help foster demand for market innovations, such as 
credit information bureaus, that benefit financial deepening. As microfi-
nance institutions grow, increased competition will result in better 
borrower choice among lenders, which can mean higher default rates as 
the bond between borrower and lender weakens.102 Moreover, a sound 
credit history can play the role of “reputation collateral” for microcredit 
borrowers, who usually lack much by way of physical collateral.103 Thus, 
there is an increasing need for credit information clearinghouses to fa-
cilitate microfinance.104 Clearinghouses can play critical roles in financial 
development more broadly by reducing asymmetry of information be-
tween borrowers and lenders, and thus reducing risk. Well-developed 
credit information clearinghouses are essential to widespread consumer 
and retail lending.105  
                                                                                                                      
 100. See, e.g., Robert Peck Christen, Commercialization and Mission Drift: The 
Transformation of Microfinance in Latin America (CGAP Occasional Paper No. 5, 
2000); Elisabeth Rhyne & Robert Peck Christen, Microfinance Enters the Market-
place (U.S. Agency for International Development Document 1999). 
 101. See John Coffee, Convergence and its Critics: What are the Precondi-
tions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? (Columbia Law & Economics 
Working Paper No. 179, 2000) (providing an example of demand-led theories of legislative 
change), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=241782. 
 102. See McIntosh & Wydick, supra note 50 (regarding the increase of competition 
among microfinance institutions and the potential negative impact on default rates). 
 103. See Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, supra note 
86, at 2. 
 104. See Rhyne & Christen, supra note 100 (noting that Chile’s credit bureau helped to 
promote bank entry into the microfinance market). 
 105. See Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, supra note 
86. 
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Banks, however, may not demand clearinghouses, or may support 
clearinghouses in which only banks get access to the credit data. As a 
theoretical matter, the private returns to banks are lower (or put another 
way, the private costs are higher) than the social returns to information 
sharing under a number of plausible scenarios.106 Moreover, because of 
the closed nature of bank lending in many developing countries, where 
banks only lend to the elite—their depositors—and these depositors 
largely borrow from their bank, the incentives for banks voluntarily to 
share information about their borrowers is significantly diminished. As 
Tressel argues, relationship lending and below-market deposit rates link 
banks and borrowers, but new borrowers are not part of the equation.107 
In a number of developing countries, public credit bureaus were created 
in the 1990s only after massive economic shocks to the financial system, 
or conversely, only after long periods of economic stability, during 
which the lack of credit bureaus may have delayed more rapid growth.108 
Moreover, good clearinghouses are hard to build. In many countries, 
one needs to worry about corruption, erosion of privacy, lack of com-
plete and accurate information, and technical capacity, as well as 
fragmented credit information availability and restrictions on what type 
of institution may use the data.109 In the United States, credit bureaus 
were built up as voluntary process over a very long time.110 In developing 
countries, microfinance institutions might work together to broaden ac-
cess to existing credit clearinghouses, so that a wider range of 
institutions can have access to the credit data, a wider range of borrowers 
are recorded in the system, and both positive and negative credit histo-
ries are recorded, rather than simply focusing on negative reporting. 
Where such credit information clearinghouses do not yet exist, microfi-
nance institutions can help to develop such clearinghouses, either 
privately, in conjunction with the banking sector, or through the central 
                                                                                                                      
 106. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 43 J. Fin. 
1693 (1993). 
 107. Tressel, supra note 17, at 6.  
 108. See Margaret J. Miller, Credit Reporting Systems Around the Globe: The State of 
the Art in Public Credit Registries and Private Credit Reporting Firms, in Credit Reporting 
Systems and the International Economy, supra note 86, at 25, 34–35; Andrew Powell 
et al., Improving Credit Information, Bank Regulation and Supervision: On the 
Role and Design of Public Credit Registries 5 (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3443, 2004), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/39968_wps3443.pdf. 
 109. See generally Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, 
supra note 86; Rhyne & Christen, supra note 100, at 23 (noting that Bolivia restricts participa-
tion in the credit bureau to banks). 
 110. See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote 
Accurate Credit Reporting? (Joint Center For Housing Studies Working Paper BABC 04-14, 
2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babc_04-14.pdf. 
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banks, by establishing public registries with procedures for access by a 
wide range of creditors. 
Lastly, as microfinance institutions have grown and some of them 
have taken on retail deposits, questions have arisen about whether and 
how to regulate them. Microfinance institutions have presented chal-
lenges to developing governmental systems. Because they tend to offer 
different services—depending on the location in which they operate, the 
economics and needs of the clientele, the sophistication of their pro-
grams, and their financial success—the regulatory scheme can vary.  
With regards to deposit taking, microfinance institutions are broadly 
categorized in two groups. Some microfinance institutions have for a 
long time required cash balances to be maintained by borrowers as a 
form of collateral, earnest money, or a demonstration of ability to repay. 
Other institutions have served more broadly to mobilize the savings of 
poor communities as an end in itself or as a source of funding for credit 
and other operations. As microfinance institutions increasingly look to 
diversify their sources of funding through retail deposit taking, there has 
been a concomitant rise in interest in the appropriate forms of supervi-
sion and regulation for microfinance institutions. These distinct 
scenarios represent challenges for governments focusing on creating 
fledgling regulatory regimes. 
There is a burgeoning literature in this area,111 and for purposes of 
this short Article, I only wish to offer a few basic observations. As an 
initial matter, I agree with commentators who suggest that microfinance 
regulation, at least in terms of prudential supervision, ought to be gener-
ally reserved for institutions that take retail deposits beyond the small 
deposits of earnest money that some microfinance institutions collect 
from their borrowers.112 Moreover, small, rural microfinance institutions, 
even those that accept small levels of deposits, would be difficult to su-
pervise effectively, and may be better off left unregulated, if the 
regulations cannot be tailored to be reasonably cost effective for regula-
tors and the microfinance institutions. If regulatory costs drive such 
institutions to be non-viable, depositors may be forced to leave their sav-
ings in higher-risk mechanisms (e.g., buying livestock, keeping cash 
                                                                                                                      
 111. See, e.g., Rodrigo Chaves & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Principles of Regulation and 
Prudential Supervision and Their Relevance for Microenterprise Finance Organizations, in 
The New World of Microenterprise Finance: Building Healthy Financial Institu-
tions for the Poor 55 (Mario Otero & Elisabeth Rhyne eds., 1994); Robert Peck 
Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks for Mi-
crofinance (CGAP Occasional Paper No. 4, 2000). 
 112. Robert C. Vogel et al., Microfinance Regulation and Supervision Con-
cept Paper 3 (Microenterprise Best Practices Working Paper, 2000). 
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under the mattress).113 The volatility, geographic and sector concentra-
tion, fast growth, and low capital of many microfinance institutions may 
mean that regulators would need to require high capital adequacy ratios 
for deposit-taking microfinance institutions.114 Because prudential regu-
lation is hard to do well, donors, international financial institutions, and 
microfinance institutions ought to think about strategies that would delay 
the need for such regulation. For example, microfinance organizations 
could choose not to fund themselves directly with deposits, but to serve 
as deposit-takers for supervised depositories who can then lend to micro-
finance institutions more cheaply or pay fees in exchange for deposit 
funds. Donors could also encourage microfinance institutions to take on 
risk-mitigation measures, such as pooled loan loss funds or other de-
vices. 
The challenges of extending supervision to large numbers of often 
quite small microfinance institutions would be enormous, given the inef-
fectiveness of normal supervisory tools (for example, capital calls are 
more difficult given that “equity” may consist entirely of donor grants, 
and stop lending orders will undermine repayment in programs that rely 
on graduated loan ladders as an incentive for repayment).115 Moreover, 
many developing countries with scarce governmental capacity will have 
difficulties implementing the new Basel capital standards even for the 
largest commercial institutions, without regard for the microfinance sec-
tor. Thus, developing nations should be cautious about extending 
supervision beyond large microfinance institutions that choose to take on 
retail deposits and commercial banking institutions that choose to take 
on microfinance. A number of large microfinance institutions are already 
regulated banks, credit unions, or other licensed entities. Many of these 
institutions started out as smaller, microfinance-focused organizations, 
while others were mainstream banks that chose to move into the micro-
finance sector, in whole or in part. The main challenge for regulators will 
be to adapt prudential supervision to take account of the particular risks, 
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Robert Peck Christen et al., Microfinance Consensus Guidelines: 
Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance (CGAP Docu-
ment 2003), available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/Guideline_RegSup.pdf; Elizabeth Rhyne 
& Maria Otero, Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles and Institutions, in The 
New World of Microenterprise Finance: Building Healthy Financial Institutions 
for the Poor, supra note 111, at 26. 
 114. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 112, at 5. 
 115. See, e.g., Christen et al., supra note 113; Garry Christensen, Limits to Informal 
Financial Intermediation, 21 World Dev. 721 (1993).  
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and risk mitigation techniques, of microfinance undertaken by both 
mainstream and microfinance-focused institutions.116 
V. Conclusion 
Microfinance is not a panacea, but it is a more promising approach 
than many we have had for development for some time, in its own right. 
I suggest that by thinking about financial development from a microfi-
nance vantage point, we might increase the likelihood that financial 
development more broadly can contribute to poverty alleviation. This 
preliminary Article is largely aspirational, rather than empirical, and 
much further research is required to test out these propositions. 
                                                                                                                      
 116. See, e.g., Christen et al., supra note 113; Vogel, supra note 112, at 11 (arguing for a 
focus on better information systems and risk-based supervision of loan training, monitoring, 
and staff control systems.) 
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